The way in which fee reductions influence legal aid criminal defence lawyer work: insights from a qualitative study by Thornton, J
© James Thornton 2019. Journal of Law and Society © 2019 Cardiff University Law School. Blackwell Publishing. 
 This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here for personal use, not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in Journal of Law and Society (2019) 46(4). DOI: 10.1111/jols.12179. Available at: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14676478 
The Way in Which Fee Reductions Influence Legal Aid Criminal Defence Lawyer 
Work: Insights from a Qualitative Study 
JAMES THORNTON* 
 
This article examines how fee reductions influence criminal defence lawyers’ work. Data 
from 29 qualitative interviews with English defence solicitors and barristers are analysed in 
order to understand the way in which cuts to fees paid by government for criminal legal aid 
work can operate to influence criminal defence lawyers’ working practices. I use game 
theory and Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and field to build a theoretical construct 
illustrating the invidious position current financial conditions place criminal legal aid 
lawyers in. I argue that these conditions reward and encourage perceived poor practices and 
values to thrive at the expense of other concerns - such as the conviction of the guilty, 
acquittal of the innocent, fair treatment of both victims and defendants, and value for the 
taxpayer. Ultimately, I argue that criminal legal aid lawyers are set up to fail by the current 
financial conditions within which they must work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The fees paid by government for criminal defence work have been reduced many times over 
the years. The last increase of any sort was in 2007.1 Furthermore, changes to payment 
systems can cause indirect further reduction.2 Whilst some maintain that England and Wales 
has one of the most generous legal aid systems in the world,3 criminal lawyers themselves 
report a growing sense of crisis, resulting in industrial action and court challenges.4 This 
provides the opportunity to consider how criminal defence lawyers cope with cuts to fees in 
this context. This article analyses some findings from my own empirical research on this 
issue.5 The central question it seeks to address is how the practices of criminal legal aid 
lawyers are influenced by the limited financial context within which they must work. That 
question is itself underpinned by concerns about how to make sense of defence lawyers’ own 
accounts of this in a critical, but fair, way. Hence, it builds upon recent empirical studies 
critiquing the practices of criminal legal aid lawyers and seeks to move beyond underlying 
conflicts that can be seen between them. Drawing on game theory and the Bourdieusian 
concepts of habitus, field and capital, the article proposes an original lens for understanding 
the empirical data of the current study and future socio-legal work. I first outline relevant 
features of how publicly funded defence lawyers are paid in England and Wales, before 
highlighting relevant studies that have conducted similar work. I next explain how I use 
Bourdieu’s concepts, alongside my research methods. Discussion and analysis of this study’s 
empirical data follows. 
 
CRIMINAL LEGAL AID PAYMENT SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES AND 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
Criminal defence advice and advocacy is mainly provided by the private sector.6 Solicitors 
firms make contracts with the Legal Aid Agency (LAA) to provide criminal defence services 
for specific parts of the country. Crown Court advocacy is paid for direct under a separate 
scheme. Both litigation and advocacy are generally paid in the form of fixed fees. Different 
fixed fees exist for different kinds of work, such as different kinds of offences and different 
outcomes (guilty plea vs trial and so forth). In some cases, that fixed fee will be increased if 
                                                 
1 Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007 – for advocacy only. Solicitor fees stayed the same. 
2 See, for example, changes to emphasis placed on pages of prosecution evidence and the resulting judicial 
review: R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2018] EWHC 2094 (Admin). 
3 See, for example, then Justice Secretary Chris Grayling’s foreword: ‘Transforming Legal Aid: delivering a 
more credible and efficient system’ CP14/2013. 
4 Criminal Bar Association Members Announcement 29/03/2018 
<https://www.criminalbar.com/resources/news/announcement-for-cba-members>; 
Law Society v Lord Chancellor op. cit., n. 2. 
5 J. Thornton, ‘The Impact of Criminal Legal Aid Finance Reduction on the Work of Defence Lawyers’ (2018) 
PhD thesis, University of Southampton. 
6 For a more detailed guide, see V. Ling et al., LAG Legal Aid Handbook (2013/14 – 2018/19 edns). 
the case crosses a complexity threshold. For example, the number of pages of prosecution 
evidence (PPE) and trial days allow Crown Court fees to “graduate” upwards.7 
 
There are particular categories of legal aid work that are unconditionally free, for example, 
police station advice, however for other legal aid work – including trials – the lawyer must 
apply for a Representation Order. The client must satisfy two tests: income (“means”) and 
interests of justice (“merits”).8 The former restricts the scheme to those whose earnings are 
below a certain level. The latter restricts the scheme to serious cases, by reference to statutory 
criteria.9 The merits test is automatically passed for Crown Court trials.10 A Crown Court 
Representation Order can be subject to a Contribution Order: requiring the defendant to pay a 
financial contribution, refunded if they are acquitted. 
 
Much previous research has considered the work of defence lawyers. Two themes emerge:  
1. Critiquing or defending the working practices of lawyers; 
2. The effect of changes to lawyer payment structures (mainly focused on fixed fees vs 
hourly rates). 
The latter includes quantitative work examining the introduction of new schemes at the 
macro-level. This study builds upon these two themes by examining the (related but separate) 
effect of cutting fees (rather than changes to payment structures per se), in the context of the 
changed payment structures identified by previous work in the second theme. In doing so, it 
also builds on the work of the first theme by providing an explanation for why some defence 
lawyers might behave in the way that they do. 
 
As to the first theme, much previous work has reported negatively. McConville, et al.’s study 
of 48 defence firms11 found numerous examples of poor practice by defence lawyers, 
especially in pushing defendants towards guilty pleas.12 This built upon an earlier detailed 
study of police force areas, which also criticised the defence lawyers involved for abandoning 
all but the shell of adversariness”.13 Mulcahy, in a study of two English magistrates’ courts 
(consisting of pre-trial review observation and interviews with practitioners), found similarly 
negative influences.14 Lawyers were “acutely aware” of the financial disadvantages of trials, 
and this influenced the way they worked: to avoid them, in favour of negotiated settlements.15 
Focusing on barristers, Morison and Leith’s interview study found that because “time is 
                                                 
7 PPE relevance for advocates has now been substantially reduced, but still plays a key part for assessing 
litigation work complexity. See: Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 Sch 1-2 (as amended). 
8 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO), s17(1). 
9 Id. 
10 ‘2017 Standard Crime Contract Specification’ (Legal Aid Agency February 2017), clause 10.144. 
11 Standing Accused (1994) 15. 
12 Id., pp. 268, 210, 160. 
13 M. McConville et al., The Case for the Prosecution (1991) 168. 
14 A. Mulcahy, ‘The Justifications of Justice: Legal Practitioners’ Accounts of Negotiated Case Settlements in 
Magistrates Courts’ (1994) 34 Brit. J. Criminology 411 at 415. 
15 Id., p. 412. 
short, and pressures are constant”,16 they noted that cases were often poorly prepared.17 These 
studies supported similarly critical findings from the 70s onwards - including work from the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, which branded its findings on police station work 
“disturbing”.18 Although these studies are now somewhat dated, a more recent ethnographic 
and interview study carried out by Newman in three English criminal legal aid firms was also 
strongly critical.19 Participants “moved away from client-centeredness and towards 
managerial, profit centred concerns.”20 Newman questioned the role of finance however: “the 
values that informed these lawyers should take centre stage over and above how they coped 
financially.”21 The most recent work on Crown Court advocacy, involving 46 trial judges 
(grouped by circuit)22 found that judges felt quality had declined and blamed finance 
reduction as a barrier to quality.23 
 
In contrast, Travers’ work reported positively on lawyer behaviour in his study.24 Likewise, 
Herbert, through observation, analysis of registers and 38 semi-structured interviews with 
magistrates court participants (including defence solicitors) found more benevolent 
behaviour.25 For example, tactically entering a not guilty plea, not for personal gain, but to 
force prosecution disclosure of information.26 A report by the Solicitors Regulation Authority 
(SRA) also recently considered the state of criminal defence firms, using surveys and 
interviews, and was broadly very positive – although it did identify some issues, for example, 
staff training.27 For barristers, Tague (having interviewed about changing to a fixed fee 
system) argued that, although lawyers may benefit from clients pleading not guilty in the 
Crown Court (for financial and career development reasons),28 this often aligns with client 
interests too.29 
 
The key point here is that practitioner behaviour can be variable and can influence the 
criminal justice process. The current study builds upon this finding by examining one reason 
for this, namely: fee reduction, and its mechanism for influencing behaviour. 
                                                 
16 J. Morison and P. Leith, The Barristers’ World and the Nature of Law (1992) 91. 
17 Id., pp. 43-44. 
18 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report (Cm 2263/1993) Para 59. 
See: A.E. Bottoms and J.D. McClean, Defendants in the Criminal Process (1976); 
J. Baldwin and M. McConville, Negotiated Justice (1977); J. Baldwin, Pre-trial Justice (1985); A. Sanders et 
al., ‘Advice and Assistance at Police Stations and the Duty Solicitor Scheme’ (Lord Chancellor’s Department 
1989); D. Dixon, ‘Common sense, Legal Advice and the Right to Silence’ [1991] Public Law 233; J. Hodgson, 
‘Adding Injury to Injustice : the suspect at the police station’ (1994) 21 J. of Law and Society 85. 
19 D. Newman, Legal Aid Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (2013) 30. 
20 Id., p. 159. 
21 Id., p. 158. 
22 Geographical criminal justice area. There are 6 across England and Wales. 
23 Hunter et al., ‘Judicial Perceptions of the Quality of Criminal Advocacy’ (2018), 4.1. 
24 M. Travers, The Reality of Law (1997) 
25 A. Herbert, ‘Mode of Trial and Magistrates Sentencing Powers: Will Increased Powers Inevitably Lead to a 
Reduction in Committal Rate?’ [2003] Criminal Law Rev. 314, at 316. 
26 Id., p. 321. 
27 Solicitors Regulation Authority, ‘Criminal Advocacy Thematic Review’ (2018). 
28 P. Tague ‘Barristers’ Selfish Incentives in Counselling Clients’ [2008] Criminal Law Rev. 3, at 6, 12. 
29 P. Tague, ‘Tactical Reasons for Recommending Trials Rather Than Guilty Pleas in the Crown Court [2006] 
Criminal Law Rev. 23, at 25. 
 As to the second theme, Goriely et al.’s study looked at the introduction of a public defence 
solicitor’s office in Scotland, alongside the traditional private sector firms being paid by 
public funding. A quantitative study of 2600 cases was carried out between April and 
December 1999, supplemented by 48 interviews with relevant actors, including lawyers.30 On 
the basis of their data, they argued that behavioural changes were strongest in “ethical 
indeterminacy” situations: where several plausible choices of what to do in a case exist.31 The 
researchers involved would later reflect that this had concrete consequences: public defence 
solicitor’s office lawyers resolved cases earlier than private ones.32 They concluded that 
solicitors were “routinely influenced” by financial incentives.33 Study of the introduction of 
fixed fees in Scotland similarly found that this had influenced the behaviour of practitioners 
(particularly in, as before, situations of “ethical indeterminacy”).34  For example, increasing 
volume of cases35, avoiding client support,36 avoiding interviewing witnesses37 and, because 
of systemic quirks at the time, pleading not guilty initially (to secure legal aid) and then 
guilty later on in the process.38 “almost none” of the lawyers involved said they were unaware 
of the most financially efficient way to deal with cases.39 Of course, as Tata later put it: 
lawyers don’t always follow financial interest, but nor can they ignore finance, rather, finance 
is one factor among many other competing considerations.40 Somerland found similar in 
England, examining the impact of introducing fixed fees, she interviewed lawyers from 20 
firms.41 Findings were not encouraging. As one interviewee put it: “Lawyers are learning to 
use the standard fees system and do very little for it.”42 Macro-level quantitative work has 
also considered these issues. Bevan carried out an analysis of the then government’s claim 
that demand for legal aid is “supplier induced”.43 In the criminal context, commenting on a 
drop in the volume of criminal work in the Crown Court or higher, Bevan noted that the unit 
cost (total spend, divided by number of acts of assistance) had increased in response.44 
Similar work considered the impact of a finance change on defence lawyer behaviour 
(introduction of fixed fees). Gray et al. predicted a reduction in quantity or quality of work 
                                                 
30 T. Goriely, et al., The Public Defence Solicitor’s Office in Edinburgh: An Independent Evaluation (2001) 
31 Id., p. 69 
32 C. Tata et al., ‘Does Mode of Delivery Make a Difference to Criminal Case Outcomes and Clients’ 
Satisfaction? The Public defence Solicitor Experiment’ [2004] Criminal Law Rev. 120, at 127 
33 Id., p. 135. 
34 F. Stephen and C. Tata, Impact of the Introduction of Fixed Fee Payments into Summary Criminal Legal Aid : 
Report of an Independent Study (2007) 55. 
35 Id., p. 29. 
36 Id., p. 38. 
37 Id., p. 40, in line with similar behaviour observed in England in the past: R. Young et al., In the Interests of 
Justice? (1992) 75-76. 
38 Id., p. 66. 
39 C. Tata and F. Stephen, ‘Swings and Roundabouts: Do Changes to the Structure of Legal Aid Remuneration 
Make a Real Difference to Criminal Case Management and Case Outcomes?” [2006] Criminal Law Rev. 722, at 
739. 
40 C. Tata, ‘In the Interests of Clients or Commerce? Legal Aid, Supply, Demand and “Ethical Indeterminacy” 
in Criminal Defence Work’ (2007) 34(4) J. of Law and Society 489, at 496. 
41 H. Somerland, ‘Criminal Legal Aid Reforms and the Restructuring of Legal professionalism’ in R. Young and 
D. Wall (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (1996) 307. 
42 Id., pp. 310-311 
43 G. Bevan, ‘Has there Been Supplier Induced Demand for Legal Aid?’ (1996) 15(2) Civil Justice Q. 98. 
44 Id., p. 109. 
and little money being saved (due to lawyers playing the system).45 Later, Fenn et al.’s paper 
tested this hypothesis, using data from 1988-1994 legal aid bills (before and after fixed fees). 
They agreed: “solicitors do respond to financial incentives; something that economic theory 
recognises, and current/future reform should acknowledge”.46 This supports the earlier 
theme’s findings on practitioner power and willingness to influence case outcomes, but also 
makes the link between that and payment structure changes. 
 
Again, it could be said these findings are out of date, but Welsh’s more recent work also 
considered the impact of fixed fees (alongside means testing) on the work of solicitors in the 
magistrates court. Interviewing twelve defence lawyers (+ seven prosecutors) in South East 
England, alongside twenty days observation, the study confirmed that the introduction of 
fixed fees disincentivised work on cases. However, Welsh departed from the lawyer critique 
seen in the first theme. Her interviewees felt unhappily torn between duties to their clients 
and business needs.47  
 
Hence, the previous work shows that defence lawyers can and have behaved in an allegedly 
poor way and negatively influenced the criminal justice process (as seen in the above 
examples from the literature). It also shows that this can be influenced by changes to the way 
defence lawyers are paid – for example, salaried public sector vs private sector and the 
movement towards payment by fixed fees. The current study adds to this by examining the 
effect of the similar, but distinct, change of lowering fee levels (in the context of the payment 
structures analysed in previous work). It also builds upon the analysis of lawyer behaviour 
seen in the first theme by both identifying current poor practices and providing a mechanism 
to explain how and why some lawyers may behave in this way.  
 
The above research also shows a dichotomy between studies which, to a greater or lesser 
extent, paint lawyers in a positive light (for example, Travers, Welsh, SRA, Tague) and those 
which do not (for example, McConville, Newman, Somerland, Baldwin). Of course, the 
diverse set of views these individuals have are not as neat and tidy as such a broad division 
suggests: this approach requires a degree of crude generalisation. For example, later work by 
Newman shows him (as a researcher) struggling to reconcile the lawyer behaviour he 
observed with interview comments from those same lawyers, by looking at the matter from 
several different lenses.48 I am not suggesting that these researchers approach the issue from 
an unnuanced perspective. However, to typecast the studies in this general way does allow us 
                                                 
45 A. Gray et al., ‘Controlling lawyers' Costs Through Standard Fees: An Economic Analysis' in Young and 
Wall (eds) op. cit., n. 41, p. 215. 
46 P. Fenn et al., ‘Standard Fees for Legal Aid, an Empirical Analysis of Incentives and Contracts’ (2007) 59(4) 
Oxford Economic Papers 662, at p. 678. 
47 L. Welsh, ‘The Effects of Changes to Legal Aid on Lawyers’ Professional Identity and Behaviour in 
Summary Criminal Cases: A Case Study’ (2017) 44(4) J. of Law and Society 559, at 575-576. 
48 D. Newman, ‘Are lawyers alienated workers?’ (2016) 22 European J. of Current Legal Issues; 
‘Are lawyers neurotic?’ (2018) 25(1) International J. of the Legal Profession 3; R. Dehaghani, and D. Newman 
‘ “We’re vulnerable too”: an (alternative) analysis of vulnerability within English criminal legal aid and police 
custody’ (2017) 7(6) Oñati Socio-legal Series 1199. 
to consider two broad, conflicting, perspectives and the opportunity to move beyond such 
conflict with an alternative lens. The following section unpicks the nature of this tension in 
more detail, before outlining my own methods and how I seek to avoid it. 
 
 
METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
 
The disparity in judgment of defence lawyers noted above, particularly well exemplified by 
McConville et al. (who castigated their behaviour)49 and Travers50 (who complimented it) 
generated some robust discussion. Travers contended that other studies preached about 
morals and conduct from the assumed-to-be-privileged epistemological standpoint of the 
academy.51 Instead, Travers argued academics must first understand how subjects themselves 
view the world and the incidents under discussion, giving the example of his magistrates 
court observation. What seemed like “a lawyer using her position of power to persuade a 
vulnerable client to plead guilty” was actually a lawyer securing the best outcome, “in real 
time, and in full knowledge that, whatever she did” the defendant would have been 
convicted.52 
 
Travers critiqued McConville et al’s work along those lines and reliance on the 
“correspondence theory of truth”: researchers claiming their version of the police and 
criminal defence lawyers reveals the “objective reality” of the process.53 In other words 
“structuralism” – the epistemological belief that there is an overarching objective structure, 
which, if only we can understand it, explains social phenomena.54 Fundamentally, this is an 
example of objectivism. Travers argued this can be viewed differently: under the 
“congruence theory of truth”, “reality is a product of the way in which the observer describes 
it” and there are therefore multiple realities to consider.55 In other words, “interpretivism”: 
there is no understandable objective structure per se – reality is a product of the way 
individuals experience it.56 Hence the argument that searching for abstract and generalist 
structures takes us away from “the richness of reality”.57 Fundamentally, an example of 
                                                 
49 Op. cit., n. 11. 
50 Op. cit., n. 24. 
51 Id., p. 157. 
52 Id. 
53 M. Travers, ‘Preaching to the Converted? Improving the Persuasiveness of Criminal Justice Research’ (2001) 
37(3) Brit. J. Criminology 359, at 366. 
54 A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (first published 1936, 2001) Exemplifies the extreme of this: if 
assertions are not verifiable by empirically observable reality, they are nonsense. 
55 Travers, op. cit., n. 53, pp. 366-367. 
56 Newman, op. cit., n. 19, p. 26. 
57 M. Weber, ‘ “Objectivity” in Social Science’ in M. Weber, On the Methodology of the Social Sciences (E. 
Shils and H. Finch eds and trs), p. 80 
“subjectivism”. Travers argued that McConville et al. dismissed58 this division’s implications 
too readily.59 The result is that it is “remarkably easy” to criticise their findings.60  
 
A robust defence was published in the same journal,61 labelling many of Travers’ points 
“strange” and citing a passage from the authors’ own study “because Travers seems not to 
have read it”…62 In essence, their approach was fine because, despite Travers’ criticism, it 
produced “illuminating” findings.63 They also criticised Travers’ approach as having “a risk 
of extreme relativism… accepting at face value practitioners’ own rationalisations for their 
(mal)practices.”64 
 
Hence, researchers have a quandary: how to conduct and analyse research without blindly 
accepting lawyer participants’ attempts to self-justify poor practice,65 but not unfairly judging 
from an academic pedestal. On the one hand, McConville et al. were entitled to describe their 
findings as “illuminating” because they were illuminating: they illustrated a previously 
unknown problem (and resulted in reforms, such as an accreditation scheme for police station 
legal advisers). However, Travers’ critique, (that it is vulnerable to counter-attack, unfairly 
caricatures those involved and is unlikely to be persuasive to those whose behaviour it is 
seeking to change) also appears to ring true - with for example, Newman’s recent research 
suggesting the behaviour of some defence lawyers has not improved many years later.66 This 
divergence continues to this day. As we saw, both Newman and Welsh did very similar 
things (they observed defence solicitors at work and interviewed them about it). Yet, 
Newman concluded that quite apart from finance, the lawyers simply did not regret their poor 
behaviour.67 Welsh referred to and then explicitly diverged from Newman’s view, arguing 
her interviewees were torn between duties to clients and business needs.68 
 
Newman attempted to escape this predicament, using Giddens’ “structuration theory” 69 to 
produce an “integrated methodology” in his study of legal aid lawyers.70 This was a 
compromise between the many firms studied by McConville et al. and Travers’ single study 
of one firm in depth. Newman did three months of ethnographic observation, and then 
interviews at three firms. Newman also made some important presentation changes to begin 
                                                 
58 McConville et al., op. cit., n. 13, p. 13. 
59 Travers, op. cit., n. 53, pp. 366-367. 
60 id., p. 367. 
61 L. Bridges et al.,‘Can Critical Research Influence Policy? A Response to Max Travers’, (1997) 37(3) Brit. J. 
Criminology 378. 
62 id., pp. 378, 380. 
63 id., p. 380. 
64 id., p. 379. 
65 Which the self-justifying individual themselves may be unaware of. See M. Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy 
(1980) 153, outlining “cognitive shields” individuals use to rationalise malpractice. 
66 Newman, op. cit., n. 19, pp. 144-146. 
67 Id., pp. 86, 158. 
68 Welsh, op. cit., n. 47, pp. 576-577. 
69 A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society (1986). 
70 Newman, op. cit., n. 19, p. 27. 
to address the methodology problems he had identified: presenting data first with little 
comment, and then his commentary. 
 
Nonetheless, Newman’s conclusions were similarly critical to McConville et al. and similarly 
at odds with more sympathetic studies. I argue this is because, whilst the study did make 
changes to methods and some changes to methodology, such changes did not go far enough. 
Newman’s solution focused firstly on methods, compromising between McConville et al.’s 
large number of (Travers would argue) shallower studies and Travers’ in-depth single study 
and secondly on methodology, but only in so far as the way the analysis and data were 
presented or laid out. However, the way that data is analysed is just as important as its 
presentation. Travers pointed out previous researchers had used the same methods he used. 
The difference was “not method, but methodology.” That being, “the different assumptions 
informing the collection and analysis of data”71 (my emphasis). Hence, beyond changing the 
layout, this quandary requires a willingness to appreciate both perspectives of data. 
 
I suggest that we can do so using Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field and, capital and 
(crucially) the way they interact. This approach to both Bourdieu’s concepts and the above 
issues provides a unique way to move beyond the above conflicts and an innovative lens with 
which to analyse and understand defence lawyer accounts in this area. I will briefly outline 
these in general before discussing how they apply to this issue.72 Bourdieu’s work sets out to 
solve this “artificial” division between subjectivism and objectivism.73 In simple terms 
Bourdieu’s argument is that people behave in the way they do because of the interaction 
between habitus, field and capital – which, together, take account of both the subjective and 
the objective perspectives discussed earlier.74 
 
Habitus consists of “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and 
organise practices and representations”.75 Habitus is a “disposition” in the sense that it refers 
to someone’s inherent qualities, which influence the way they behave. This disposition is 
“durable” because it can become self-perpetuating. Someone’s habitus is influenced by the 
choices they make, but it also influences those choices as well: a “present past”.76 Past 
experiences influence not only the choices we make in future, but also the choices we can 
comprehend. If, practically, someone has choices A-Z, their habitus may mean they can only 
comprehend choices A-E and are pre-disposed to particularly favour choices B and C. It is a 
“structured” structure in the sense that it is “structured” by a person’s past experiences and 
the resulting structure is not random, but based on what has gone before. This structure is 
                                                 
71 Travers, op. cit., n. 24, p. 14. 
72 For a detailed, multi-theorist, introductory analysis of Bourdieu, see: M. Grenfell (ed.), Pierre Bourdieu: Key 
Concepts (2nd edn., 2014). 
73 P. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Richard Nice tr., 1990) 23. 
74 Id. p. 23. 
75 id. p. 53. 
76 id. p. 54. 
itself “structuring” in the sense that it influences a person’s future decisions (then forming a 
fresh part of their habitus). 
 
Hence, habitus is a combination of what a person is inclined to do and an individual’s sub-
conscious understanding of how the world works – or rather, how their world works. This 
leads to the concept of field: someone’s social environment. Bourdieu likens it to a game. The 
field is the “objective structures within which it is played out”.77 This includes the pitch/board 
the game is played on and the field’s territorial limits (each is a “separate universe governed 
by its own laws”).78 Fields range in size. For example, in Homo Academicus, Bourdieu 
analysed academia as a “field”79 and contemporary society in The Weight of the World.80 The 
criminal justice process is our “field”. 
 
Individuals have positions within fields. This leads us to the concept of “capital”: the way 
power in a field is measured.81 For Bourdieu, one element is money/assets: “economic 
capital”.82 The other (often more important) element is “symbolic capital”;83 sometimes 
broken down into sub-groups, such as “social capital” (who an individual knows), or 
“cultural capital” (someone’s taste and lifestyle).84 but in total it amounts to the tastes, 
values, lifestyle and so on of the dominant group’s habitus in a given field.85  
 
The interaction between habitus, field and capital explains someone’s “practice”. A crucial 
part of an individual’s habitus is defined by reference to field: what Bourdieu calls a “feel for 
the game”-86 acclimatisation to how the world works in a particular field. This runs in both 
directions. The field influences a person’s habitus, which helps ensure field longevity. It will 
be full of actors whose habitus is influenced and built for that field – it is in their interest to 
ensure the field stays that way.87 For example, in a corrupt country’s criminal justice “field”, 
a lawyer whose habitus aligned with those conditions would be accustomed to it. They may 
see possible actions for themselves (such as bribing judges) that someone outside that field 
would not  - or if they did, would nonetheless decide not to do. The crooked lawyer has a 
“feel for the game” here. Habitus also influences the field, because the field’s continued 
existence partly depends on the practices of those within it. If the habitus changes, the field 
itself can change. In this example, the crooked lawyers are themselves contributing to an 
environment of corruption and it is in their interests for that field to continue since their 
habitus allows them to flourish in it (this accustomed habitus is itself a potent form of 
                                                 
77 id. p. 66. 
78 P. Bourdieu, The Social Structures of the Economy (Chris Turner tr., 2005) 7. 
79 (Peter Collier tr., 1990). 
80 (Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson tr., 1999). 
81 P. Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’ in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. 
J. Richardson (1986) 243. 
82 Id. p. 242. 
83 Bourdieu, op. cit., n. 73, p. 119. 
84 Bourdieu, op. cit., n. 81, p. 243. 
85 id., pp. 244-245. 
86 id., p. 66. 
87 Bourdieu, op. cit., n. 73, p. 67. 
symbolic capital). Equally, if the field changes too much too quickly, those with a habitus too 
specialised to the original field may be unable to cope (a concept Bourdieu called 
“hysteresis”).88 For example, workers dealing with the “restructuring” of the western steel 
industry.89 Capital then measures an individual’s power in a field, but this links back to 
habitus because a habitus suited to the field, a perfect “feel for the game”, is itself the 
ultimate form of symbolic capital for that field. 
 
Understanding the necessary interaction and relation between these concepts (the objective 
“field” and subjective “habitus”) connects the subjective with the objective to come to a 
meaningful understanding of individuals’ practices and escapes the above epistemological 
dichotomy. Both of these perspectives are vital pieces of the puzzle in trying to explain why 
defence lawyers in legal research studies behave in the way that they do. Hence, using the 
data, I sought to understand the relationship between the views and perspectives of defence 
lawyers and the environment within which they must work. 
 
One potential objection remains. Whilst Bourdieu’s habitus concept usefully draws attention 
to something significant and offers a way of thinking about that, it is abstract.90 It is difficult 
to specify that “this person’s habitus is X and not Y.”. In our context, however, I argue we 
can illustrate it through a model of Rational Self-interest, based upon the game theory of 
Albert Tucker’s “Prisoner’s Dilemma”. In Tucker’s hypothetical experiment, a prosecutor 
makes a deal with two guilty accomplices: if they implicate the other, the prosecutor will 
drop their charges, but their accomplice will be convicted and imprisoned for three years. If 
they both do this, then the prosecutor can convict both (but with credit for pleading guilty) 
and ensure they serve 2 years each. If neither gives in, the prosecutor will only be able to 
convict them both of a lesser offence: 1 year’s imprisonment: 
  
Prisoner A 
  
Cooperate Betray 
Prisoner B Betray 
Prisoner A:  
3 years 
Prisoner B: 
free 
Prisoner A: 
2 years 
Prisoner B:  
2 Years 
Cooperate 
Prisoner A: 
1 year 
Prisoner B: 
1 year 
Prisoner A: 
free 
Prisoner B: 
3 years 
 
Cooperate = “cooperate” with your accomplice 
Betray = implicate your accomplice 
                                                 
88 Id., p. 62. 
89 Bourdieu, op. cit., n. 80, pp. 6-23. 
90 K. Maton, ‘Habitus’ in Grenfell, op. cit., n. 72. 
A “purely rational” individual will always betray. For Prisoner A, if Prisoner B betrays, their 
best option is to also betray, minimising loss: 2 years imprisonment, not 3. If Prisoner B 
cooperates, Prisoner A’s best choice is still to betray, ensuring no time in prison at all, rather 
than one year. When both do inevitably take this view, they both end up in a worse position 
than if they had cooperated. The prosecutor is the real winner. 
 
Of course, that does not mean that the prisoner’s dilemma theory’s outcome (that both 
individuals will always betray) is inevitable. The rational or natural response may be to 
betray all the time, but it does not have to be that way. There is much more to human decision 
making than self-interested logic. Many participants in empirical tests of the dilemma have 
demonstrated more altruistic behaviour than the theory suggests: real people do not always 
pick “betray”.91 Nonetheless, it provides a useful way to view habitus in this context in a less 
abstract way. If an individual with a particular habitus would “betray” every time they were 
faced with this sort of choice, we can classify their habitus as having internalised values of 
rational self-interest. This provides a useful benchmark for the analysis that follows. 
 
THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
The research aimed to evaluate the extent to which fee reductions influenced defence lawyer 
behaviour in the current system, building on the previous work examining the influence of 
changes to the way lawyers are paid (as opposed to how much) and providing a mechanism 
for this influence. 
 
A total of 29 participants took part in semi-structured interviews: 16 barristers (11 different 
chambers), 12 solicitors and 1 caseworker (12 different firms). Solicitor participants were 
recruited via an invitation letter sent to criminal legal aid firms listed by the LAA as 
undertaking criminal legal aid work in southern England. These were further encouraged to 
nominate colleagues whom they thought may be interested. One interviewee referred to a 
large Facebook group of practising criminal lawyers, whose administrators allowed a post 
asking for interested participants. Based on the comparatively much smaller pool of 
practising Criminal Barristers,92 a slightly different approach was taken. Letters were sent to 
the treasurers of each of the four Inns of Court (every barrister must join an Inn to qualify as 
a barrister) explaining the research and the need for participants. Three of the Inns responded 
and advertised the research to their members. A similar approach was taken with the Criminal 
Bar Association, who agreed to advertise the research in their weekly newsletter for several 
months. Further willing interviewees were located by the endeavours of personal and 
professional contacts working at the Bar. Interviews took place between late 2015 and early 
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solicitors firms) – Ministry of Justice, Litigators Graduated Fees Scheme and Court Appointees Equality 
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2017. This would have allowed for some interesting analysis of changing perspectives over 
time, however, when comparing interviews, views were remarkably consistent. 
 
Interviews were conducted either in-person or via telephone. Participants were asked open-
ended questions about the impact of finance reduction on their work (in the context of recent 
and proposed cuts), general questions about the cases they had recently done, as well as more 
specific questions about finance reduction – often based upon things other interviewees had 
mentioned in order to triangulate claims. As Chan points out, “different accounts of the same 
phenomenon” are a useful cross-referencing tool.93 Questions about unethical behaviour were 
asked abstractly to avoid being personal (i.e. “Do you think others in your position might be 
tempted to do [socially frowned upon behaviour]?”94 In terms of transcripts, some changes 
were made for easier reading: for example, repeated words, filler discussion and interviewer 
replies of “yes”, and so on are omitted. Italicised text within square brackets is a paraphrase 
of something an interviewee said (to save space). Non-italicised text in square brackets is to 
clarify how or what was said. Unique expressions were modified to preserve anonymity. 
 
There are limits to this method. Whilst barrister interviewees were spread out, the solicitor 
interviews were carried out primarily in the south, (albeit there were some from outside this 
area) and it nonetheless represents a small percentage of criminal practitioners in England 
and Wales. These findings are not generalisable across the country. Rather, they show what 
is capable of happening, and has happened, amongst a set of lawyers in various locations, 
firms and chambers, and at many different levels of experience. Such findings are valid, 
dependable,95 and generalisable in terms of, as Peräkylä put it when interviewing counselling 
professionals, what those who were not included in the study could do - given that they have 
similar options available to them.96 
 
There is also a conceptual limit in terms of how to (normatively) judge the quality of defence 
work described here in itself. Much of the following discussion considers issues and 
examples which interviewees themselves considered “poor practice”. However, the extent to 
which this genuinely reflects the objective reality of the situation is unknown. What 
constitutes “good” and “poor” practice is greatly debateable. For example (as mentioned 
earlier), one of Travers’ lawyers persuaded a vulnerable client to plead guilty,97 but if 
conviction was inevitable (as that lawyer believed) one could argue the best possible result 
was achieved. Others would say that “good practice” in that situation means fighting the case 
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95 L. Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in The Oxford Handbook of Empirical 
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to the bitter end.98 Some view good lawyering as that which provides greatest assistance to 
the court, whereas others argue strongly against this.99 Some argue that getting what the client 
ultimately wants is what good lawyering is. The client decides the “destination” and the 
lawyer must find the best route.100 Even this raises problems though: as Tata argues, wishing 
to, for example, “get off”, can mean a number of different things: reduced charge, reduced 
sentence, complete acquittal etc.101 “What is deemed to be favourable to the client (‘get off’) 
can only be understood in terms of clients’ (managed) expectations.”102 Broader analysis of 
law and the work of lawyers would also critique the assumption that “lawyering in itself” is 
good.103 Cain considers that there can instead be “serious questioning” of the assumption that 
law and lawyers as we know them are good things in themselves.104 These conceptual 
questions of what it means to be a “good” lawyer are hugely important. However, they cannot 
be answered by this study (other than to provide examples of what a selection of lawyers 
think it is and is not). Nevertheless, the research does reveal whether interviewees feel the 
need to do things that they believe are not conducive to good defence work. Findings on this 
point can still themselves be insightful in understanding how fee reductions affect the work of 
defence lawyers, even though ultimately whether the implications of such findings are 
normatively ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is debateable. 
 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Interviewees highlighted 3 key issues in which reduced finance played a part: 
1. Advice on plea (both guilty and not guilty) 
2. Junk and Golden cases 
3. Thorough working 
 
As will become apparent, there are two interrelated aspects of finance to each of these issues. 
Firstly, the payment structure itself (how fees are calculated for particular work) arguably 
sets up all three of these issues. In that sense, what follows reinforces previous work on the 
issue of fixed fees etc. and provides more recent examples of its operation. Secondly though, 
the reduction in rates in terms of absolute level of income (I used to get paid X for doing this 
item of work, but now it is Y% less) is also a frequent feature in the interviewee accounts of 
these three issues. The research therefore focuses on the influence of absolute level fee 
reductions in the context of the overall payments regime. Both of these combined appear to be 
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capable of making a difference to the way the lawyer involved views the situation they are in. 
Hence, the practical effect of cuts cannot be understood without reference to the payment 
regime and this is reflected in the interviewee comments. 
 
For each of these issues, my point is not that defence lawyers always conduct themselves in 
the ways described below, but that the effect of finance reduction within this payment regime 
is to reward those who would and punish those who would not. In Bourdieusian terms, the 
habitus that is most aligned to this field (in other words, that has the highest level of capital – 
that is, the most useful disposition to possess) is that which is predisposed to do so. If habitus 
is how an individual sees their world and is inclined to behave in it, then the habitus which 
the current field (the legal aid criminal defence market) rewards here is that which both sees 
the opportunities presented below and is willing to act on them. As pointed out earlier, 
habitus, field and capital are all interrelated. A habitus in-tune with the field is valuable 
capital (the measure of an individual’s power in a field) because it allows an individual to 
succeed in that field, in much the same way that an elite footballer’s “feel for the game” sets 
them apart from the amateur in terms of sporting success on the football field. As we shall 
see, the trouble here is that, rather than practitioner excellence, a different kind of habitus is 
rewarded in our field: one that accords with our model of rational self-interest, based upon 
Tucker’s betraying prisoner. 
 
1. Advice on Plea 
Incentives here do not point in one direction. Rather, sometimes it was in interviewees’ 
interests to encourage guilty pleas and sometimes to encourage not-guilty pleas. 
 
Interviewees gave many examples where they felt financially pressured to run cases to trial 
and also felt that influencing the process in this way was not difficult. For example, Solicitor 
C and Barrister K. 
 
Solicitor C:  
If you’ve got a big case in the Crown Court, you’re gonna make a big fee out of it on 
a not guilty. If it’s a guilty plea, you’re not. So it’s not a very difficult exercise to 
persuade a client, to say, “well, it looks a bit difficult, but I think we’ve got a good 
run here! I think we should run it!” Even though it might be very much in people’s 
[clients’] interests to say “early guilty plea first opportunity in the Crown Court, 
maximum mitigation, and maximum discount on the sentence”, but it means a 
reduction in fee. 
 
Barrister K:  
You know exactly what everything's worth. And there are times, well, put it this way: 
there's someone who says they want to plead guilty; I would never persuade them to 
plead not guilty, even if it was in my financial interest. But if they're not very sure, I 
will outline the two scenarios: this will happen if you plead guilty, that will happen if 
you plead not guilty, which is normal advice, but I probably wouldn't seek to persuade 
them to plead one way or the other if it wasn't in my financial interest. Although I 
would never persuade anyone out of acting against my interests, I probably wouldn't 
persuade them into it. 
 
These views support the Scottish studies’ findings on “ethical indeterminacy”: where the 
choice is between two courses of action, both of which have advantages and disadvantages, 
greater weight is placed on the advantages that flow from a course of action that is in one’s 
own interests. Less weight is placed on those that flow from actions that run contrary to one’s 
interests.”105 Barrister K’s comments relate to a situation where the choice between pleas is 
very finely balanced. In such a situation, they admit, the greater weight is placed on their own 
interests. The trouble of course is that the more fees are cut, the more financial pressure there 
is and the more heavily it will weigh towards self-interest in these situations. Furthermore, 
Stephen and Tata argue, “the simple distinction between [client] “instructions” and [lawyer] 
“advice” is less clear-cut than these terms suggest”.106 As mentioned previously, clients do 
not always provide clear instructions and lawyer advice can sometimes be robust.107  
 
Few said this impacted their own advice, but this again illustrates how the field can reward 
what the lawyer involved views as “poor practice” (by prioritising rational self-interest) and 
vice versa punish “good practice”. The habitus of value here, is that which prioritises those 
concerns of rational self-interest (illustrated by Tucker’s hypothetical prisoner). This 
opportunity exists because of the different fixed fees available for this kind of work, relative 
to the actual time it will take to do. In that sense, it relates to the payment structure itself. For 
Barrister E (amongst others), it is the combination of this field condition and the further 
condition of direct reduction in fees paid that influences here. 
Barrister E:  
you’re conscious when you’ve got a case which represents a certain sum of money, 
and there aren’t that many cases like that around anymore, because the cuts and 
because more work is going in-house108 and so you’re looking at where you’re less 
willing to give up what that case might be should it go to trial. 
 
In other situations, it was in a lawyer’s financial interest for clients to plead guilty. 
For example, 
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Solicitor A: It’s in your commercial interest on occasion to get a client to plead 
guilty. Lots of small hearings, associated with the orderly preparation of the case, 
attract a fee of £75 and that includes travel to the court and so you can have a short 
case that actually takes up all day (because you have your place in the queue) that 
pays £75! So it is not in your interest for those hearings to take place. 
 
In a forthright109 answer to my question of whether this went on, they said it did: 
All the time! People calculate that pleading guilty will benefit the lawyer best 
commercially and it gets justified on the basis that the evidence says that, despite his 
denials, he’s probably guilty and even if he’s not he’s probably going to be convicted, 
so he’ll do better with a third off for an early plea of guilty.110 I’ve seen it on a daily 
basis that clients are pressured into pleading guilty. 
 
Morison and Leith heard this argument from barristers as well, with one interviewee stating 
“while you can’t force him to plead guilty, there is often good reason for him to plead guilty 
for his own benefit.”111 Again, this is a combination of two field conditions: the payment 
regime in itself (which allocates relatively different fees for guilty and not guilty work in 
particular contexts) and absolute reductions in those fees themselves. The habitus that 
accords with Tucker’s rational prisoner appears to be most valuable in this context. 
 
Solicitor H and Barrister O illustrate this dual operation of payment structure and fee 
reduction:  
Solicitor H: if I'm in my local magistrates' court on a Monday morning and I've got 
three cases to do, then I'll break even, but if I still have to be there for one case, then I 
won't - and one case can take as much time as three. You’re working on very reduced 
fees and every time they chop at it, it makes you closer to not being able to provide 
the service 
 
Barrister O:  
There are always instances where you could advise a client to plead guilty and it 
would be better for your bottom line, but your professional integrity says you don't do 
that. I'm not saying this is something that's recent in terms of the dilemma itself - it’s 
always been there - but these further cuts in legal aid have made it more likely. 
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These comments support the view of lawyers being aware of the financial benefits (or not) of 
particular options, in line with Tata and Stephen’s and Mulcahy’s earlier findings.112 How 
much this operates in reality is unclear. Certainly previous research and these interviewee 
comments suggest it is something a lawyer is capable of doing. As Morison and Leith point 
out, managing one’s time (and ensuring one is doing the right case at the right time) is a key 
skill of the barrister.113 One interviewee pointed out that a quick guilty plea is one way of 
doing this,114 with many of their other respondents (as here) describing unscrupulous 
colleagues forcing clients into pleading guilty for financial reasons.115 Likewise Baldwin’s 
early work provides a multitude of examples of defence lawyers “talking sense” into their 
clients116 and few of the lawyers in that study anticipated serious difficulty in doing so.117 The 
comments here are also quite consistent with Baldwin and McConville’s defendant 
interviewee references to lawyers pulling “a fast one” “to get it over with”.118 Mulcahy’s 
observation illustrates the same phenomenon.119 One reason why lawyers would want to do 
that today is, as we have seen, financial pressure. 
 
Some interviewees spoke in terms of cuts in legal aid making it “more likely” (e.g. Barrister 
O), whereas others more candidly stated it was going on (e.g. Solicitor A). Either way, such a 
setup favours the lawyer who is willing to do so and punishes those who do not, by making it 
very difficult to financially survive. In terms of our analysis of habitus and field, we can see 
that the habitus attuned to this field would be one that did so. 
 
2. ‘Junk’ and ‘Golden’ Cases 
 ‘Junk’ and ‘golden’ cases are those at the extreme ends of the fixed payment scale: situations 
where it would be financially self-defeating for the lawyer involved to take a case (junk 
cases) vs cases that are so remunerative that they could be the difference between having a 
profit and not (golden cases). Whilst any fixed fees system can expect slightly anomalous 
results relative to the actual work spent on a case, these should eventually balance. This is a 
feature of the payment regime, but reduction in finance raises the stakes of getting and 
keeping golden cases and getting rid of or avoiding junk ones. The combination of these two 
field conditions creates a unique field. For example, Solicitor G said that their firm only made 
a profit in a recent year thanks to two high paying Crown Court cases. 
 
Solicitor B (amongst others) considered all magistrates and police station work was generally 
unprofitable: If you had no Crown Court cases in a six-month period you would go out of 
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business. Solicitor B did this as a loss leader (police station clients arrested for serious 
offences may retain services in the Crown Court) and as a source of cash flow. 
 
There were exceptions to this though. Solicitor C dealt with the issue of certain clients being 
golden: 
 I’ve got a particular client who’s now on case number 215 [with me]. He’s subject to 
several different ASBOs and [example of how every now and then he breaches the 
ASBO] and he probably gets 4 cases a year now. Every now and again he’ll try and 
get off one, but 9/10 he’s in the magistrates court, it’s a guilty plea. Thursday night: 
offence. Guilty plea: Friday morning. 15-30 mins work: £190. So it came out well! 
 
Conversely, some clients were most undesirable, related to their likelihood of being granted 
legal aid. Many mentioned the self-employed, who would struggle to apply for legal aid and 
were therefore at an unwelcome risk of failing the means test for legal aid (meaning their 
lawyer would not be paid at all), but the same was also said regarding likelihood of success 
with the merits test too. 
 
Solicitor D gave the example of two hypothetical shoplifting clients: 
[if] all he’s gonna get is a fine or a conditional discharge, you might think “If they’re 
not granted legal aid, the time I spent on his case is wasted.” [On the other hand] 
let’s assume he’s got a terrible record and he’s kept in custody, or even better he’s on 
a suspended sentence, then you think to yourself “well I’ve got a pretty much 
guaranteed legal aid order here”. So you’re ideal shoplifting client is somebody 
who’s in receipt of income support [easy to prove means test], on a suspended 
sentence, in custody [easy to pass merits test]. 
 
In that example it is the same crime, but with different clients the work can be junk or golden. 
This small selection of examples interviewees gave illustrates how a case can be a junk or a 
golden one for the most arbitrary of reasons. This reflects Kemp’s120 and Welsh’s121  later 
findings on the risks of representing some clients and then not getting paid. Welsh found that 
some lawyers represented these for free.122 However, the appetite for this decreases when 
fees reduce. As Solicitor H put it: Your good will, your, sort of, slack and wiggle room, is 
compromised considerably when the fees are cut. Whilst there may be other reasons for 
working pro bono, such as maintaining good relationships with other actors in the process,123 
this too has its limits. Barrister J, for example, managed to drastically cut down on a category 
of case many regarded as unprofitable,124 whilst still maintaining goodwill with their 
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solicitors. The combined field conditions of the payments regime and lower fees generally 
again suggest that the habitus which flourishes within it is one which would maximise gold 
cases and minimise junk ones. 
 
The choice of the lawyer involved here is not quite that simple though. Interviewees reported 
a number of responses to these sorts of cases short of simply dropping them. For example, 
some junk cases not done out of goodwill were: 
Barrister H: knocked down from someone who’s more senior all the way down to 
someone who’s low enough on the ladder that they need the experience and they'll 
take the case no matter what.  
The problems are significant, as Barrister H reflected:  
I have had a few cases where I'm sure that they were innocent and they probably 
needed, in a couple of cases, more senior counsel than me. And because of legal aid… 
I don't know if those kind of counsel are going to get the case 
 
This is in line with Tague’s view that junior barristers benefit from running trials to 
demonstrate their skills.125 This concern could equally operate as an incentive to accept 
complex cases from others that would otherwise be regarded (by those more senior) as junk 
cases. This allows very junior barristers to practise their skills and improve their CVs. 
Morison and Leith also noted cases “passing from hand to hand as their true nature is 
discovered until, at last, a difficult, unprofitable or poorly prepared case finds its way to a 
new barrister too lowly to pass it on further.”126 It seems this practice lives on as a key part of 
the habitus for the lawyer who wishes to succeed in this field (though arguably this is better 
than no representation at all). 
 
Another approach was to do them, but not very well. As Solicitor B put it when describing 
unprofitable magistrate court cases:  
They’re just seen as “£200 here, £300 there”. That’s the legal aid cuts writ-large in 
the sense that there isn’t any incentive. 
 
Solicitor D provided another example of how this might impact, using the hypothetical 
example of going back to the police station to observe identity parades in a golden murder 
case vs in a junk shoplifting case and also the effect of different clients: 
You have to think, effectively, strategically about this. You have to think to yourself, 
“what’s most cost effective?” To make sure that I’m doing what I’m required to do in 
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providing the appropriate level of service to the client, but not bankrupting the firm 
while I’m doing it… 
 
You’ve also gotta think about the client. If it’s a regular client, who gets arrested 3 or 
4 times a year, that client’s very important to your firm. So you’ve got to manage him, 
which means when he asks for somebody to come you’ve gotta go. 
 
As with advice on plea, this phenomenon of some cases being worth considerably more than 
others is largely brought into existence by the payment regime (which specifies that X work 
attracts X fixed fee and Y work attracts Y fixed fee etc.) However, when this is combined 
with an absolute reduction in fees, the impact of the incentive is felt to be greater, as Solicitor 
D illustrates: You think to yourself “well it wasn’t so bad last year, but this year I’ve got to 
do the same work and I’ve had my fee cut 17.5%.”. And it does mean that there are certain 
things, which in the old days you would do without thinking, nowadays you do think about 
quite hard. 
 
There is an apparent state of conflict between the habitus encouraged by the state of the field 
(which resembles that of the Tucker’s rationally self-interested prisoner) and the habitus 
some defence lawyers would prefer to have (having recognised encouragements towards 
what they considered “poor” practice). Whilst many experienced lawyers still do junk cases 
out of a sense of duty, when fees are cut, that which used to be done without question is now 
thought about quite hard, as Solicitor D pointed out. Indeed, Solicitor D’s comment illustrates 
the shift in terms of habitus towards rational self-interest well. The defence lawyer that 
thrives (or survives) in this field, is the one that is prepared to avoid junk cases (which can be 
“junk” for all sorts of arbitrary reasons) and chase golden ones. Those who do not, struggle to 
make a profit. 
 
3. Thorough Working 
Some work, under the current fee system, was considered financially disadvantageous to do. 
This supports many of the findings of studies that have examined the impact of payment 
structures. The point I seek to illustrate here is how these problems are exacerbated by 
finance reduction. 
 
Solicitor B considered this a general issue:  
What’s happening now is that you’re getting what I would describe as bare minimum 
preparation. And it’s very difficult to motivate yourself if you can get away with bare 
minimum preparation. Because again you’re trying to maximise your fee earning 
capacity and that really is by picking and choosing what work you do. 
Likewise with barristers, even at the best of times, as Morison and Leith found, barristers 
avoided spending too much time on certain unprofitable activities (such as legal research).127 
 
Many gave the example of considering unused material. This work is notionally included in 
the fixed fee, but the fee is the same no matter how thoroughly it is reviewed and the defence 
case statement incorporating those insights is prepared. Despite this being important work 
(one textbook considers its importance “cannot be overstated”128) in practice the financial 
incentive is to spend as little time as possible. Barrister G gave an example from their 
practice of how this might operate: 
There was a couple of hundred hours-worth of CCTV footage which we then had to 
go to the police station to watch - myself and the solicitor. So we did that and it was 
very revealing. So those three days that we spent at a station in [city], we got 
absolutely nothing for even though it was vital to our client’s case. Certainly it would 
have been in my financial interest to go to court somewhere else rather than going to 
the Police Station to watch the CCTV. I could have taken on other cases during those 
three days and made money. 
 
Not everyone is going to be willing or financially able to work three days for free. Indeed, the 
efforts of Barrister G and their instructing solicitor in the police station are already going well 
beyond what was observed by others earlier, for example, Dixon (“often passive and 
unsupportive”)129 and the Royal Commission (“disturbing”)130 - in better financial times. 
Whilst this phenomenon is not unique to the legal profession, in most jobs there is little 
incentive to do less (except laziness). Whereas here, as Barrister G said, spending less time 
on one task, can mean more remunerative work is done in its place. This is partly to do with 
the payment regime (in that, for example, Barrister G’s extra time spent at the police station 
is not taken into account in calculating the fee), but again, the reduction in fee level itself 
within this regime makes the stakes uniquely high here. As Solicitor E put it in relation to the 
same issue of unused material:  
The tighter you cut the funding, the more pressure there is on everyone to cut corners 
and put your own interest first and they can say ‘till the cows come home “well, you 
should put your clients’ interests first”, but when it’s your own bread and butter and 
your firm’s gonna go under... 
 
The lawyers involved viewed spending a great deal of time on the unused as being “good 
practice”, but to do so has a cost, perhaps fatal to firm solvency. The habitus that would 
succeed under these field conditions is not one that would pre-dispose somebody to do the 
work on the unused material thoroughly, but to spend as little time as possible on it – just like 
Tucker’s rational prisoner. Unused material is just one example. Various other interviewees 
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made similar points in relation to appeals (from both magistrates’ courts and Crown Court), 
staff training, assessing expert evidence and interviewing independent witnesses to events. In 
each case, as Solicitor A put it: “You either do the job properly and lose money or you don’t 
do the job properly.” 
 
Sadly, this is reminiscent of Plotnikoff and Woolfson’s findings on the matter of appeals for 
the Royal Commission, in the wake of several high profile miscarriages of justice, as far back 
as 1993! 25% of prisoners received no assistance from a lawyer within the 28 days after their 
conviction (significant, due to appeal time limits),131 alongside concerning qualitative 
comments. They blamed ignorance of the law and good practice guidelines,132 yet 
interviewee comments in the present study suggested that, for them, it was the combination of 
the payment system and fee reduction. This suggests the problem is now one of financial 
resources, rather than education, and again shows how the habitus that favours financial self-
interest is the most useful to have here. Likewise, the concerns about training support those 
raised in the SRA’s recent thematic analysis on the same point133 and explain why some firms 
may struggle to do so. Interviewees wanted to put on training, but the financial context makes 
this difficult. 
 
In general, this is a similar response to that found in the Scottish study on the introduction of 
fixed fees: less time is spent on unprofitable activity, such as interviewing witnesses.134 
Interviewees here illustrate the same thing happening when rates are lowered. Every reaction 
here is to either do work for free (which, in this payment regime particularly, becomes more 
difficult as cuts bite) or to cut corners. Interviewees were clearly unhappy about this, but also 
appreciated the financial reality. The alternative, as with some of the interviewees, is to leave 
criminal law before being forced to do that. The field rewards those who cut corners and 
punishes those who do not. 
 
4. Habitus, Field and Rational Self-interest 
The habitus required to financially survive and thrive in this field is that of a person pre-
disposed towards favouring their own finances above other considerations. This mindset 
(although hopefully not widespread) is rewarded, whilst other approaches are punished. 
 
The comments discussed above suggest defence lawyers find themselves in a similarly 
invidious position to that of the prisoner in Tucker’s thought experiment discussed earlier: 
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Classic Prisoner’s Dilemma 
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Cooperate = “cooperate” with your accomplice 
Betray = implicate your accomplice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defence Lawyers’ Dilemma 
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In this diagram “Other Concerns” refers to the variety of (albeit sometimes conflicting) other 
objectives the criminal justice system is believed to have, although of course what these 
actually ought to be is a matter of intense debate.135  
 
The particular context of the legal aid field means that the consequences are worse than the 
classic prisoner’s dilemma. Classically, if both sides betray they end up in the second-worst 
state. Here, Other Concerns end up in their worst state, whenever the lawyer chooses betray, 
irrespective of the MoJ’s choice. As noted when looking at previous studies, lawyers have the 
influence at this point. Conversely, again unlike the classic prisoner’s dilemma, if both sides 
cooperate, instead of both achieving the second-best outcome, Other Concerns can achieve 
the best outcome for the same reason. Unlike the classic version, there is not necessarily any 
loss to Other Concerns by cooperating. This doesn’t affect the choice: it is still in both side’s 
self-interest to betray; it just worsens the consequences. 
 
In that sense, this work provides a practical example of economists Fenn et al.’s argument: 
“solicitors do respond to financial incentives; something that economic theory recognises, 
and current/future reform should acknowledge.”136 The same can be said for changes in rates. 
Once we understand that lowering rates has the effect in this field that it does in incentivising 
a habitus entirely at odds with non-financial concerns, it should not be at all surprising if 
some lawyers behave this way. Game theory tells us this is the rational way to behave. 
Having the values of the Rational Self-interest model internalised as part of one’s habitus, 
alongside the insider knowledge on how best to manipulate the system (and, based on the 
interviews, most lawyers clearly have this knowledge) rewards the defence lawyer in this 
field. Possessing this habitus is the ultimate form of symbolic capital. Those who do not will 
find themselves out of place and pressured to either leave or struggle to run a solvent 
business. This need not be something the individual lawyer is aware of either. Habitus is a 
somewhat sub-conscious “feel for the game”.137 Analysing how overloaded public service 
workers process ever-larger numbers of clients, Lipsky noted the use of “cognitive 
shields”.138 Practices can be blamed on systemic problems or clients themselves (for example, 
in our context, the financial pressures and the view that “he was always going to be convicted 
anyway” respectively), minimising personal responsibility. Whilst Lipsky accepts that these 
external factors do play a role, they do not mean individuals have no discretion at all. Such an 
individual could perceive their practices as good provided some clients are treated well: 
“there is no dissonance between the job as it should be done and the job as it is done for a 
certain portion of the clientele (original emphasis).139 Hence, even those with the best of 
intentions could possess such a habitus. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The central question of this article was how the practices of criminal legal aid lawyers were 
influenced by the limited financial context within which they must work, necessarily 
underpinned by concerns about how to make sense of defence lawyers’ own accounts of this 
in a critical, but fair, way. In relation to the question of influence, we have seen how the 
impoverished financial conditions of the current field put defence lawyers in something of a 
trap. The lower fees go, the more the habitus required to survive will resemble the Rational 
Self-interest model outlined. Yet, this is the kind of behaviour that many lawyers find 
distasteful. Nonetheless, game theory tells us that behaving otherwise is “irrational”. On that 
basis, blame cannot exclusively lie with “shameful” defence lawyers, like some of those in 
Newman’s ethnographic work.140 There may well be lawyers who have, like some of 
Newman’s research subjects, “moved away from client-centeredness and towards managerial, 
profit-centred concerns”,141 but even if they did have those client-centred values, the problem 
would remain. The trouble is that lawyers are operating in a field where the values of such a 
habitus are not conducive to success, whereas “managerial, profit-centred concerns” are. 
Much like Bourdieu’s interviewees in The Weight of the World, such a habitus is out of sync 
with the field conditions and can only survive for so long.142 On that basis, Newman’s overall 
critique is a little unkind. Calling for changes in legal education, lawyer self-reflection or 
other attempts to teach lawyers the correct values to hold,143 underestimates the influence that 
one’s environment has on one’s values and disposition – which the Bourdieusian field--
habitus lens developed in this article allows us to appreciate. There is little point saying 
defence lawyers should have a particular habitus that contains the values I think are 
laudable,144 if it sets them up to fail in their field. The problem is both that the field does not 
accommodate (let alone encourage) lawyers who put their concerns about quality above 
concerns about finance and that some lawyers might put financial concerns first. Indeed, 
Bourdieu’s point was that these two are interconnected: the field contributes to (or even 
creates) and internalises the habitus and the habitus maintains that field - they cannot be 
looked at in isolation.145 This new lens allows us to make sense of lawyer accounts (and 
therefore to understand a mechanism for how financial changes can influence defence lawyer 
work) in a way that is both critical, but fair. It is not unduly harsh on defence lawyers: 
through the concept of field, we can appreciate the context within which they must work. 
However, neither does it provide a blanket justification for putting financial concerns first: 
the concept of habitus recognises that individuals do have some control over their own 
decisions within the field, even if, as Lipsky’s work suggests, some do not realise this. It was 
noted that one way of classifying the abstract concept of habitus was to construct a model of 
rational self-interest, based upon Tucker’s hypothetical prisoner’s dilemma. Favouring one’s 
own concerns over others makes entirely logical sense in Tucker’s example, as it does in 
many of the examples interviewees shared in this work. However, we also noted that this did 
not mean it had to be that way and that empirical tests of the dilemma demonstrate more 
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altruistic behaviour than Tucker’s theory would suggest.146 Not everyone betrays, no matter 
how much in one’s interests it might be. Those lawyers who take a similar approach are to be 
commended, but we must also recognise that, under the current financial conditions, they are 
working heavily against their own interests in doing so. Hence, the Bourdieusian lens allow 
us the critical distance to appreciate the connection between context and the individual and 
how each can influence the other. The challenge for socio-legal scholars is to never lose sight 
of this connection and interaction in research. The challenge for policymakers is to avoid the 
temptation to see fee cuts as an easy solution for savings and, rather, appreciate the risks of 
financial self-interest-focused practice and inefficient working that this mechanism and the 
empirical data here suggests cuts can encourage. 
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